

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 02342 01 OF 02 041144Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 122135

P 041100Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4432

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2342

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR, AF, IN

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

1. BEGUM BHUTTO CALLED MY WIFE LAST NIGHT TO ASK
IF WE WOULD BE HOME IF THEY DROPPED BY TO SEE US,
AND ALMOST BEFORE I COULD CHANGE OUT OF MY BLUE-
JEANS THEY WERE IN OUR RESIDENCE.

2. BHUTTO SAID HE WANTED TO SEE ME RIGHT AWAY AS
HE HAD SO MANY VISITORS SCHEDULED THAT HE DID NOT
KNOW WHEN HE COULD AGAIN SOON. I SAID I HAD WANTED
AS WELL TO SEE HIM BUT DIDN'T WANT TO CALL SO SOON
AFTER HIS RETURN AS I COULD APPRECIATE HIS SCHEDULE
AFTER BEING IN HIS CAPITAL ONLY ABOUT ONE DAY
IN THE PAST MONTH.

3. HE WAS IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD. HE TOLD ME IN SOME
DETAIL OF HIS PRESS LUNCHEON IN NEW YORK, SAYING THAT
HE HAD AGREED TO IT ONLY RELUCTANTLY AFTER HIS UN
AMBASSADOR HAD FLOWN TO CANADA TO CONVINCE HIM OF
ITS IMPORTANCE. HE SAID THAT AFTER ALL CONCERNED
EXPRESSED THEIR AGREEMENT THAT ALL WAS OFF THE RECORD
HE HAD TALKED TO THEM FRANKLY ON GEO-POLITICAL MATTERS,
INCLUDING THE RAMIFICATIONS OF "DETENTE."

4. BHUTTO THEN TOLD ME ABOUT HIS OFFICIAL TALK WITH
THE SECRETARY AND THEIR CONVERSATION AT DINNER. HIS
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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 02342 01 OF 02 041144Z

VERSION SO CLOSELY RESEMBLED THE REPORT I HAVE

RECEIVED (STATE 49421) THAT I NEED NOT REPEAT IT FOR THE DEPARTMENT. HE ALSO TOLD ME ABOUT HIS PLEASANT TALK WITH GEORGE BUSH.

5. MY IMPRESSION AFTER A TWO AND HALF HOUR TALK WITH BHUTTO IS THAT HE IS VERY PLEASED BY HIS RECEPTION IN NEW YORK. HE IS LEFT WITH DOUBTS AS TO OUR ABILITY TO CARRY ON AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY (OF THE TYPE HE WOULD LIKE) IN THIS ELECTION YEAR, MADE MORE COMPLEX THIS TIME BY THE EFFECT ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF RECENT FOREIGN AND INTERNAL MATTERS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH-CONGRESSIONAL CONFRONTATION, ETC. RATHER SURPRISINGLY, THE BHUTTO WE KNEW ABOUT YEARS AGO, HAS BECOME MUCH MORE CONSERVATIVE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. A PART OF THIS OF COURSE IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POSITION HE SOUGHT FOR SO LONG AS THE LEADER OF PAKISTAN AND FINALLY WON, AND PARTLY THE MATURITY THAT COMES BOTH FROM RESPONSIBILITY AND AGE. HE WOULD LIKE US, FOR INSTANCE, TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE AN EXAMPLE OF CUBA AND DO SOMETHING DRASTIC AS REGARDS IT THAT WOULD ELECTRIFY THE WORLD. HE WOULD LIKE US TO BECOME MORE DEFENSE CONSCIOUS AND NEVER, NEVER FALL BEHIND THE SOVIET UNION IN REAL STRENGTH. BUT OPPORTUNIST THAT HE ALWAYS WILL BE, BHUTTO IS STILL (AND I VENTURE FOR SOME TIME TO COME) BETTING ON US. BUT HE WORRIES ABOUT IT, HOPING THAT THE AMERICA HE KNOWS AND RESPECTS CAN REMAIN A STALWART BACKER OF HIS PAKISTAN AND THAT HE WILL NEVER BE FACED WITH ALTERNATIVES THAT HE INSTINCTIVELY DISLIKES. AT ONE POINT I OBSERVED THAT IT SOUNDED AS IF A GOOD PART OF THE TIME WITH THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN SPENT ON GLOBAL GEO-POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT WAS CORRECT AND HE FELT HIS ADVISERS GETTING ITCHY FOR MORE TIME ON SPECIFICS. HE SAID HE DISAGREED AS THE SECRETARY WAS FASCINATING AND THESE WERE THE REAL ISSUES IN ANY EVENT. HE ADDED WITH A CHUCKLE THAT THIS LEFT LESS TIME FOR "REPROCESSING PLANTS."

6. WE TALKED FRANKLY ABOUT THE NUCLEAR SITUATION. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT OPINION IN AMERICA WAS HARDENING
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 ISLAMA 02342 01 OF 02 041144Z

ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN TO THE POINT OF WONDERING WHETHER ANY SAFEGUARD AGREEMENT WAS REALLY GOOD ENOUGH. I SAID PAKISTAN'S RECENT AGREEMENTS HAD LEFT US IN A QUANDRY. WE WANTED, FOR INSTANCE, TO SEE THE WORLD MOVE TOWARDS REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANTS BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN WORKED OUT AS YET. BHUTTO STRESSED HIS PERSONAL PLEDGE ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS HE MADE TO US DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO THE STATES, AND HIS

DETERMINATION AND WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. AT ONE POINT HE SEEMED CLOSE TO DRAWING A CONCLUSION THAT THERE MUST BE DISTRUST OF HIM PERSONALLY. I REASSURED HIM QUICKLY THAT THAT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY INVOLVED. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT FACILITIES THAT WOULD NOT COME ON STREAM FOR YEARS AND MIGHT BE CRITICAL MANY MANY YEARS FROM NOW. NO ONE COULD KNOW AS OF NOW WHAT LEADERSHIP WOULD BE IN CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD BY THAT TIME. WHAT WE ARE INVOLVED IN WAS IN NO SENSE A CONCERN

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 02342 02 OF 02 041149Z

11

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4433

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2342

EXDIS

ABOUT HIM AS A LEADER AND PERSON, BUT A LONGER RANGE CONCERN - WHICH I TOLD HIM I FULLY SHARED. HE SAID IT WOULD HELP IN NEGOTIATING A FULL SETTLEMENT WITH INDIA IF THEY WERE IN DOUBT AS TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. I SAID I KNEW OF HIS FEELINGS IN THIS REGARD BUT REITERATED THAT WASHINGTON AND OTHERS HAD TO LOOK BEYOND SHORT RANGE ASPECTS.

7. I TOLD BHUTTO ABOUT MY VISIT TO IRAN. THE SHAH HAD MOVED TO INSURE THAT THE 150 MILLION DOLLARS INVOLVED WAS INDEED NEW MONEY FOR DEFENSE AND NOT AN ADVANCE ON PAST BUDGETARY COMMITMENTS. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WHILE I HAD DETECTED A GREAT AFFECTION AND CONCERN FOR THE NEEDS OF PAKISTAN IN IRAN, I THOUGHT HE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE BLOOM WAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY OFF THE ROSE IN IRAN, DESPITE THE SHAH'S DENIAL OF THIS FACT TO THE PRESS. IT WAS NOW A FACT THAT LARGE IRANIAN AID TO

PAKISTAN WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS. CUTBACKS OF IRANIAN COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE WERE IN FACT TAKING PLACE, BUT THEY MAINTAINED THAT NO SHORTFALL TO THE BROTHER STATE OF PAKISTAN WAS BEING THOUGHT ABOUT. BHUTTO SAID ALL THIS WAS IN ACCORD WITH HIS OWN READING OF THE SITUATION. HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE SHAH'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK. I ASKED ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SAUDI KING HERE AND HE SAID UNFORTUNATELY IT HAD HAD TO BE POSTPONED.

8. BHUTTO SEEMS CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS OWN POSITION
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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 02342 02 OF 02 041149Z

INTERNALLY, AND IT SEEMS TO ME RIGHTLY SO. INSTINCTIVE AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY THAT HE IS, HOWEVER, HE WORRIES ABOUT FORCES AROUND HIM OVER WHICH HE HAS NO CONTROL. I TOLD HIM, WHILE SEEING NO CHANGE IN DAOUD'S BASIC ATTITUDE IN AFGHANISTAN, I WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE NATURE OF HIS CABINET AND PERSONAL APPOINTMENTS IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. HE AGREED. HE SAID BANGLADESH WAS STILL WORRISOME. I SAID INDEED IT WAS, BUT GENERAL ZIA WAS SO FAR DOING A CREDIBLE JOB IN TREADING THE VERY FINE LINE HE HAD TO WALK BETWEEN HIS OWN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ONE HAND AND REGARD FOR THE INDIA PRESSURE PROBLEM ON THE OTHER. HE AGREED BUT WONDERED WHETHER THE LINE WAS TOO FINE AND THE BLOW-UP WOULD COME. INTERESTINGLY HE SAID HE DREW NO COMFORT IN OUR CUT-OFF OF AID TO INDIA. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A SAD DAY INDEED IF THE TIME CAME WHEN WE HAD NO VOICE IN INDIA.

9. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE SECRETARY FOR HIS RECEPTION OF BHUTTO. UNLESS AN ACCIDENT INTERVENES, BHUTTO IS GOING TO BE AROUND FOR QUITE A LONG TIME. HE WILL OF COURSE DISAPPOINT US ON CERTAIN ISSUES, BUT IF WE ARE WISE IN OUR POLICIES HE WILL GENERALLY BE A VOICE OF MODERATION ON THIRD WORLD ISSUES. OUR OWN CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP, AND HIS ADMIRATION AND RESPECT FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD, ARE SIMPLE PROOF THAT WHAT AMERICA DOES OR EVEN THINKS IS VERY IMPORTANT IN HIS ORDER OF THINGS.
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